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CHAPTER SIX

Natural Law in Mencius and Aquinas
RICHARD KIM

Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature
things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even
though they do not have the law. They show that the require
ments of the law are written on their hearts.
—Romans 2:1415
But the function of the heart is to reflect. If it reflects, then it
will get it. If it does not reflect, then it will not get it. This is
what Heaven has given us.
—Mengzi 6A15
[Njatural law ... is nothing other than the imprint of God's
light within us.
—Summa theologica III, Q. 91, Art. 2

The natural law theory of ethics is understood by many scholars as a dis
tinctively Western moral theory, with roots stretching back to Aristotle
and the Stoics, finding its culmination in the thoughts of St. Thomas
Aquinas. In this chapter I argue that Mencius, arguably the most histori
cally influential thinker in East Asia, also held a form of natural law
theory. Despite the variety of divergent interpretations of Mencius—as
135
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rolebased theorist (Ames), consequentialist (Im), sentimentalist (Liu),
and virtue ethicist (Yu, Ivanhoe, Van Norden)—no scholar has, to my
knowledge, suggested that Mencius holds a form of natural law theory.^
In this chapter we explore this possibility, with the hope of deepening
our understanding of Mencius as well as sharpening our understanding
of the natural law. However, what I say in this chapter doesn't preclude
the possibility that Mencius and Aquinas also held some form of virtue
ethics or even a kind of deontology, although more would need to be
done to clarify the precise sense in which they represent these theories.
My aim is to show that Mencius also held a form of natural law theory,
rather than to deny that he (or Aquinas) held a hybrid theory.
To many contemporary moral philosophers, the theory of natural
law is often dismissed as an outmoded moral system, relying on a de
funct metaphysics and erroneous biology. I find this unfortunate, since
the theory of natural law, considered in itself, offers a powerful frame
work for moral reflection and harmonizes a number of moral claims that
philosophers of different stripes would happily endorse. Not only does
it defend the authoritatively binding force of moral claims concerning
obligations or rights endorsed by Kantians, but it also grounds morality
in natural facts about human beings, upholding a sort of naturalism that
Humeans may find more congenial than ethical intuitionism or divine
command theory. And while the theistic elements that most natural law
defenders are committed to would be unappealing to many contempo
rary philosophers, at the formal level, as we shall see, the nature of the
role that the divine has within a theory of natural law seems largely left
open and may play a less significant role than scholars typically assume.^
It is important to distinguish between a formal understanding of natural
law and particular substantive conceptions of natural law. We will return
to these points later.
In the next section I will outline the central features of natural law
by examining Aquinas's theory. Then I will examine Mencius's moral
views in light of this outline and will examine the extent to which Men
cius's account can be properly understood as a natural law theory of mo
rality. I will make the case that, on the basis of this outline, Mencius's
view ought to be counted as a form of natural law theory. Then I will
reflect on how the different conceptions of natural inclinations we find
in Aquinas and Mencius highlight how our understanding of human
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nature cannot be detached from a broader normative framework. "While
there are many attractive features of the natural law theory of morality,
my aim is not to defend it as a viable contemporary theory of ethics. To
do so would require careful responses to a number of objections to the
theory. Rather, given the purposes of this volume, I hope to illustrate
how Mencius, one of the most historically influential Chinese philoso
phers, can be understood as espousing a moral theory defended by Aqui
nas, one of the most influential Catholic philosophers, and to highlight
ways in which a comparative reflection on both thinkers can enrich our
understanding of the natural law.

WHAT Is THE NATURAL LAW?
The very term natural law can be confusing, and unfortunately, we find
a range of different meanings in scholarly discussions. Instead of sifting
through the variety of meanings that have been attached to this term,
I will borrow an approach taken by Mark Murphy and examine the con
ception of natural law held by St. Thomas Aquinas, a figure widely ac
cepted as a central representative of the natural law tradition in ethics.^
Almost every book or article that discusses the tradition of natural law
ethics includes some mention or discussion of Aquinas. By taking Aqui
nas as a central representative of this tradition, we can mine his views to
extract the core features of a natural law theory and then examine Men
cius's ideas in light of those features. While not all natural law theorists
will agree with Aquinas about what is essential to the natural law, it
is reasonable to hold that a view that endorses all or most of the core
features of Aquinas's natural law account has a legitimate claim to be
counted as a form of natural law.
Consider the following description of natural law stated by Aqui
nas: "So since ... all the things subject to divine providence are regulated
and measured by eternal law, it is clear that all things in some way par
ticipate in eternal law. More precisely, because eternal law is imprinted
on them, they have inclinations toward their own proper acts and
ends
And the rational creature's mode of participation in the eternal
law is called natural law.'"^ The eternal law, briefly, is the set of immu
table laws that are present in the divine mind of God that serve as the
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archetype of all creation. You might think of them as resembling Plato's
forms, except that they are in the mind of God.® This passage demon
strates Aquinas's view that not just human beings but all of creation is
regulated by the eternal law of God. As Aquinas notes, "The eternal law
is imprinted on them," so they all have "inclinations toward their own
proper acts and ends." But the natural law is what pertains to the mode
of participation in the eternal law for creatures with the capacity to
reason and reflect. Human beings, then, like all other creatures, have cer
tain proper inclinations and ends, but because of their rational power to
direct themselves according to perceived reasons they achieve their ends
in a rational manner.
It may be helpful to unpack the concept of "natural law" by inquir
ing separately into the concepts of "natural" and "law." Let's start with
"natural." What is Aquinas's conception of nature? Aquinas draws upon
the metaphysicalcumbiological framework set by Aristotle. He takes
the natural world as exemplifying a certain structure or order—which
explains its intelligibility—and understands each living organism as pos
sessing a particular nature or form. The forms inherent in the oak tree,
tiger, or whale determine the shape and trajectory of their basic life pro
cesses and determine the sorts of characteristic activities that constitute
their lifeform; the criteria for what counts as good, beneficial, or flour
ishing for a living entity are fixed by the nature or form that the entity
possesses.
Aquinas extends the ideas of Aristotle by being more explicit about
the natural inclinations that constitute human nature. He explicitly iden
tifies, for example, four natural inclinations that constitute the human
lifeform: the preservation of life, procreation, the drive for knowledge,
and the inclination to live in a community (ST III, Q. 94, Art. 2). As
Aquinas claims, the precepts of the natural law correspond to these
natural inclinations: "It follows that all the things man has a natural
inclination toward are such that reason naturally apprehends them as
goods.... Therefore, there is an ordering of the precepts of the natural
law that corresponds to the ordering of the natural inclinations" (STlll,
Q. 94, Art. 2). Of course, how exactly we should develop and shape
these inclinations can only be understood in light of one's particular
context; individual temperament, abilities, and culture all have a critical
role to play. But at a fairly general level, we can mark out the basic incli
nations and ends that all human beings must value if they are to lead
flourishing lives.
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What about the concept of "law"? Aquinas offers the following ac
count: "Law is (a) an ordering [ordinatio] by reason, (b) directed toward
the common good, (c) made by one who is in charge of the community,
and (d) promulgated" (ST III, Q. 90, Art. 4). On Aquinas's view, laws
are not the arbitrary products of a ruler: they have a function, which is
to provide standards of conduct that direct human beings toward their
good. An essential feature of law is that it carries binding force: "Law
is a certain rule and measure of acts in accord with which one is either
induced to act or restrained from acting. For *law' [lex] is derived from
'to bind' [ligare], since law obligates [obligare] one to act" (ST III,
Q. 90, Art. 1).
Laws are standards, rules, or measures of human conduct that gen
erate requirements for action. On Aquinas's view, the obligatory force
of laws is ultimately derived from their conduciveness to human flour
ishing and the common good, which give laws their point. So the natural
law is a type of rational and normative standard that is derived from
the natural inclinations and ends determined by human nature. They
are distinct from what Aquinas calls "human laws" like traffic laws,
since human laws can be revised or discarded depending on the situ
ation. The natural law is not determined by human willing but is fixed
by the nature of human beings. In this way, while God is the creator
of human beings, the binding force of the natural law is generated, not
from the will or commands of God, but by the goods and ends that are
determined by human nature.^ Aquinas's view, therefore, counts as a
form of ethical naturalism (though clearly distinct from the sort of natu
ralism we find in Hume) and is in stark opposition to the voluntarist
theories of morality proposed by later thinkers like William of Ockham
and Samuel Pufendorf. According to the voluntarists, only the legisla
tive will of God can generate moral obligations, whereas for Aquinas
facts about what is necessary for achieving the human good can gen
erate moral duties. To illustrate this difference, consider a concrete ex
ample: the obligation to refrain from murder. On Aquinas's account,
this obligation is derived from the basic inclination toward the preser
vation of life. Taking someone's life (in the absence of some overriding
consideration) directly conflicts with this inclination and undercuts a
crucial (and obvious) condition of flourishing. On the voluntarist pic
ture, however, the obligation to refrain from murder is derived from the
command of God not to murder. Even if the voluntarist were to grant

140 Confucianism and Catholicism

Aquinas's claim that murder goes against a natural inclination inherent
in human nature, the duty to refrain from murder could be generated
only by God's command; without the legislative act of God, such an ob
ligation would simply not exist on the voluntarist account. This is not
to say that the voluntarist must deny that the preservation of life is not
a natural good, but there would be no moral obligation attached to the
preservation of life without some divine command.^

MENCIUS'S ACCOUNT OF HEAVEN (TIAN) AND HUMAN NATURE
Let us now turn to Mencius's account of heaven and human nature.
"While it will not be possible to discuss all the details of Mencius's view,
I will outline some of his core ideas that are relevant to our discussion.
Most scholars are familiar with Mencius's claim that "human nature
is good." But it is generally acknowledged by scholars that he meant by
this not that all human beings or even most human beings are morally
good but rather that human beings are endowed by Heaven (tian) with
a certain nature that is disposed toward goodness. Mencius identifies
four basic inclinations or feelings, often translated as "sprouts," which
are constitutive of human nature that can be cultivated into distinctive
virtues:
We can see that if one is without the feeling of compassion, one is
not human. If one is without the feeling of disdain, one is not human.
If one is without the feeling of deference, one is not human. If one
is without the feeling of approval and disapproval, one is not human.
The feeling of compassion is the sprout of benevolence. The feeling
of disdain is the sprout of righteousness. The feeling of deference
is the sprout of propriety. The feeling of approval and disapproval
is the sprout of wisdom. People having these four sprouts is like their
having four limbs. To have these four sprouts, yet to claim that
one is incapable [of virtue], is to steal from oneself.®
To achieve a flourishing human life, we must develop these basic aspects
of our nature (i.e., the "sprouts"), through the process of moral self
cultivation. Here we see that Mencius, like Aquinas, also accepts human
nature as the foundation for human flourishing; both thinkers identify
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a number of natural inclinations that must be properly developed to
achieve the good life. Another interesting similarity between the two
thinkers can be understood by appreciating Mencius's use of agricultural
metaphors to illustrate the process of moral selfcultivation.^ Mencius
likens the cultivation of the moral self to the cultivation of barley seeds
{Mencius 6A7). What the moral sprouts and the barley seeds share in
common is the possession of a potential that needs to be actualized
through both human effort and judicious manipulation of the environ
ment.^° There is a teleological structure to their development, which must
be followed in order to achieve complete virtue. Aquinas takes a strik
ingly similar line—drawing upon the ideas of Aristotle—by emphasizing
the importance of what completes or perfects an organism as determined
by a thing's nature. What is perfective of the barley seed, in Aquinas's
account, is its fulfillment of the potential to become mature barley; simi
larly, what is perfective of human beings is the fulfillment of the poten
tial to become rational, virtuous agents. Of course, numerous differences
remain between Aquinas and Mencius regarding the nature of the virtues
and the sorts of characteristic activities that are most essential to human
life. Nevertheless we find them taking similar approaches with regard to
the role and structure of certain foundational concepts including virtue,
nature, and flourishing.
So human nature, on Mencius's view, determines human flourishing.
But Mencius also appeals to Heaven in his discussion of nature. Quot
ing the Book of Odes (Shijing), a collection of classical Chinese poetry,
Mencius says:
Heaven gives birth to the teeming people.
If there is a thing, there is a norm.
This is the constant people cleave to.
They are fond of this beautiful Virtue.
(Mengzi 6A6)
In a related passage Mencius remarks: "To fully fathom one's heart is to
understand one's nature. To understand one's nature is to understand
Heaven. To preserve one's heart and nourish one's nature is the way to
serve Heaven" {Mengzi 7A1). From these two passages we can draw the
following points: (a) Heaven endowed human beings with their given
nature; (b) Heaven enjoys a certain authority; (c) by fulfilling our nature.
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we serve Heaven. While Heaven, for Mencius, does not appear to have
the sort of personal interest in individual human beings exemplified by
the God of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, Heaven possesses a will and
a plan that is directed toward the common good. As Philip Ivanhoe re
marks: "According to Mengzi [Mencius], Heaven has arranged things in
the world in such a way that for each thing there is a proper role and
function and the general scope and particular parts of this grand plan are
things that human beings can and must come to understand."^^ Although
the will of Heaven is not always made clear to us, Mencius sees in human
nature the imprint of Heaven's work, and by understanding human
nature as oriented toward the life of virtue Mencius comes to see Heav
en's will as directed toward the good.^^
DOES MENCIUS HOLD A NATURAL LAW THEORY?
While acknowledging that much more needs to be said about both Aqui
nas's and Mencius's accounts of human nature, normativity, and God or
Heaven, let us turn to the central question of this chapter: Does Mencius
hold a natural law theory of morality?
To answer this question I want to propose five conditions, satisfied
by Aquinas's account of natural law, that will help determine whether a
moral position counts as a form of natural law. We can understand these
conditions in the form of the following four questions: (1) Does the
theory ground human goods in human nature? (2) Are moral considera
tions ultimately grounded in facts about human wellbeing? (3) Is mo
rality backed by God or a deity? (4) Is morality authoritative over all
human beings? (5) Is morality naturally knowable by all human beings?
While I don't claim this to be an exhaustive list, I think it captures the
core ideas of Aquinas's theory.
But how many of these conditions does a theory have to meet to
count as a theory of natural law on Aquinas's view? I don't think there
is a clean answer to this question, but a theory that meets all of them or
close to all of them should count as a form of natural law.
Let us briefly go through each question. First, does the proposed
theory ground human goods in human nature? This question is im
portant since a theory of natural law needs the moral law and the rele
vant human goods to be grounded in facts about the nature of human
beings. By grounding human goods and normativity in human nature—
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particularly in the moral sprouts of human nature—Mencius's view
would answer positively on this question.
Second, are moral considerations ultimately grounded in facts about
human wellbeing? Although the natural law tradition endorses the ex
istence of moral obligations and rights, these are conceived as inseparable
from considerations of human flourishing. Unlike the Kantian picture,
morality is not a sui generis category that carries its normative force in
dependent from truths concerning human wellbeing but is instead ulti
mately derived from facts about human nature that determine the sort
of life that is good for humans. If we assume—quite plausibly—that the
moral duties or obligations Mencius would endorse are closely tied to
the development of the virtues through the cultivation of moral sprouts
embedded in human nature, I think there is good reason to take Mencius
as also understanding the normative force of moral obligations as inex
tricably bound up with considerations of human wellbeing, construed
broadly.
Next: Is morality backed by God or a deity, in the sense that the
moral laws have been sanctioned or approved by a divine being? This
question affirms the point that the natural law is a form of "law" and
appears to require a lawgiver. As Aquinas describes it, the natural law is
participation in the eternal law, which constitutes the divine ideas and
plans of God. This issue about the relevant role that the lawgiver plays
is actually quite complicated for Aquinas, and I will return to this point
below, but it is clear that for Aquinas the natural law ultimately finds its
source in the eternal law, which exists in the mind of God. But what
about Mencius? Given Mencius's view that human nature, endowed by
Heaven, is directed toward the good, and that we "serve Heaven" by
nourishing our nature, it seems clear that Heaven at least approves of
developing our nature. As discussed above, for Mencius, developing our
nature is most centrally about nourishing the moral sprouts so that they
develop into the Confucian virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual
propriety, and wisdom. Since for Mencius the proper aim of morality is
developing into a Confucian sage exemplifying these virtues, it is clear
that morality enjoys Heaven's approval.
While one might agree that Mencius affirms the view that Heaven
sanctions Confucian morality, one might wonder how this is ultimately
connected to the notion of the natural law, since we don't find Mencius
employing the sort of legal terminology found in Aquinas. Moreover,

144 Confucianism and Catholicism

Mencius's conception of morality centers on the development of a cer
tain ethical character, rather than rules, duties, or obligations. (Aquinas
too, discusses the virtues at much greater length compared to his treat
ment of the natural law.) Regarding this last point, while we do find in
Aquinas the endorsement of exceptionless moral rules (e.g., the Ten
Commandments), Aquinas understands goodness as having priority over
lightness, as revealed in his first principle of practical reason: "Good is
to be done and pursued, bad avoided" (ST III, Q. 94, Art. 2). Moral
rules and obligations, for Aquinas, are derived from their connections to
human goods. Of course, some of these rules are simply revealed to us
by God, but Aquinas would claim that even these rules are given their
point by connections to human flourishing. Going back to Mencius,
while he doesn't offer anything like a list of rules or obligations to live
by, he does endorse certain general rules (which always require proper
moral perception for correct application). Commenting on the sages,
Mencius says, "If any could obtain all under Heaven by performing one
unrighteous deed, or killing one innocent person, he would not do it"
(Mengzi 2A2). But as with Aquinas, I think we can also understand such
rules as grounded in considerations of human goods, in this case, in the
virtue of righteousness, which is necessary for Confucian wellbeing.
Nevertheless, nowhere does Mencius employ a term that resembles
Aquinas's concept of "law."" But as will be discussed further below, for
Aquinas "law" is simply a rule of action directed toward the common
good that is promulgated by a competent authority (ST III, Q. 90,
Art. 4). The kinds of rules that Mencius would have endorsed are, as I
understand him, directed toward the Confucian conception of the good,
which is ultimately grounded in the development of the moral sprouts
embedded in human nature. And since it is Heaven that has given us our
nature, the general rules of morality can also be understood as at least
indirectly given by Heaven.^"*
Given his appeals to Heaven, we can take Mencius as also accepting
morality as sanctioned by Heaven, particularly, through the nature that
Heaven has given us to follow. So while we can't say that Mencius takes
morality as backed by a lawgiver in precisely the same way that Aquinas
does, Mencius does appeal to Heaven to at least partially justify his un
derstanding of the goodness of human nature. One reason Mencius
would offer for affirming the goodness of human nature is that nature is
the product not of arbitrary processes but of Heaven's will and that
Heaven as noted earlier, works for the good.
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The fourth question asks whether morality is authoritative over all
human beings. Mencius claims that the possession of the moral sprouts
of human nature is like the possession of arms and legs in humans:
"People having these four sprouts is like their having four limbs" {Mengzi
2A6). Just as missing a limb indicates a bodily defect, Mencius would
claim that missing a moral sprout indicates a moral defect.^^ This stan
dard, Mencius would insist, applies to all human beings.
Finally, we turn to whether morality is naturally knowable by all
human beings. This is an important condition, since one of the basic
ideas of the natural law is that human beings have the natural capacity
(when developed under proper conditions) to grasp the basic tenets of
the natural law. Mencius clearly endorses this view, since he believes that
the sprouts are inherent in human nature and that all human beings pos
sess a heart that can reflect on and understand the way to become a "great
person" and avoid becoming a "petty person": "It is not the function of
the ears and eyes to reflect, and they are misled by things. Things inter
act with other things and simply lead them along. But the function of the
heart is to reflect. If it reflects, then it will get it. If it does not reflect,
then it will not get it. This is what Heaven has given us. If one first takes
one's stand on what is greater, then what is lesser will not be able to
snatch it away" {Mengzi 6A1415). This reflective capacity provides all
normal human beings with the capacity to make evaluative judgments
and grasp basic moral requirements. But training is necessary to develop
and sharpen this evaluative capacity, in the way that our natural linguis
tic capacity also requires considerable exposure and exercise to develop.
Table 6.1 summarizes the above discussion of Aquinas's and Men
cius's views on natural law.
Table 6.1. K Comparison between Mencius and Aquinas on the Features of
Natural Law
Aquinas
Does theory ground human goods in human nature?
Are moral considerations grounded in wellbeing?
Is morality backed by God or a deity?

Yes
Yes
Yes

Is morality naturally knowable by all human beings?

? Yes
Yes

Mencius
Yes
Yes
In some
sense
Yes
Yes
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Before we move on, it may be worth addressing a worry that was
briefly noted earlier, which is that the very concept of natural law re
quires legislative acts, which seem to be missing in Mencius's account.
But on Aquinas's understanding of the natural law, the legislative will of
a divine lawgiver plays a less substantial role than one might think. Con
sider the following point made by T. H. Irwin: "The relevant features of
law do not essentially involve legislation and a legislator; they can all be
understood nonlegislatively. [Aquinas] believes that natural law con
tains rules, commands, and actionguiding requirements, but he does not
argue that law essentially consists in commands that are expressions of
the will of a legislator. In his view, natural law follows from the goal
directed agency characteristic of human beings."^^
One might be worried that Irwin's view seems too deflationary and
that Aquinas takes the divine will to play a much more substantial role
in his theory of natural law. By this understanding, one might think it
more apt to call Aquinas's view a theory of natural "norms or rules."^^
Undoubtedly Aquinas takes God as the ultimate source of morality,
since God is the first cause and sustains everything, with nothing escap
ing the providential intentions of God. However, I think Irwin is right
that for Aquinas, once human beings with their given natures are created
by God, the content of morality is determined by natural facts. More
over, we do sometimes employ the term law to discuss aspects of reality
without necessarily thinking of law as being instituted by a legislator,
for example, in talking about the "laws" of physics or chemistry, suggest
ing that our contemporary usage of the term may be broader than we
might think. I would, however, acknowledge that room needs to be made
for the background metaphysics that makes natural law a kind of law.
Here, Mencius's views about the authority of Heaven and his view that
we should serve Heaven by fulfilling our nature seem to me to offer
enough divine metaphysical backing to sustain the obligatory force of
law as Aquinas envisions it.^® This may strike some readers as making the
concept of "natural law" too broad, but given Aquinas's own fairly wide
understanding, this seems to me a warranted interpretation.
REFLECTIONS ON THE LIST OF NATURAL INCLINATIONS
IN AQUINAS AND MENCIUS
If, as I have tried to show, Mencius's moral theory counts as a natural
law theory of morality, how might it help advance our understanding of
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the natural law? One way that Mencius may help contribute to our un
derstanding of natural law is by drawing attention to aspects of human
nature that are not explicitly discussed in Aquinas. Recall that Aquinas
lists four natural inclinations in his discussion of the natural law: (1)
selfpreservation, (2) procreation, (3) knowledge, and (4) life in society
{ST III, Q. 94, Art. 2). Mencius, however, identifies the following four
natural inclinations (or "sprouts") as central to our understanding of
human nature: (1) compassion, (2) disdain, (3) deference, (4) approval
and disapproval {Mencius 2A6). Both Aquinas and Mencius take these
various inclinations as directing us toward significant human goods that
need to be properly developed or shaped in order to achieve human
flourishing. One clear difference is that Aquinas's list is broader than the
list of Mencius in that it contains not only those natural inclinations that
are unique to human beings, such as the inclination toward knowledge
and life in society (although one could make the case that both exist in
other animals, albeit in more primitive forms), but also those inclinations
shared by all living organisms, such as selfpreservation, and the inclina
tions shared by all animals, such as the drive to reproduce. Mencius,
however, is more concerned with sociomoral inclinations that are cru
cial for life in community.^' The feeling of compassion draws us to be
concerned about the welfare of others; the feeling of disdain alerts us to
the shamefulness of certain actions; the feeling of deference furnishes us
with a sense of respect for others and toward ritual practices; the feeling
of approval and disapproval allows us to evaluate the character of others
and to understand how to develop other virtues. Each of these basic in
clinations, after a long process of selfcultivation, will develop into a par
ticular virtue. Undoubtedly, much more discussion is needed to flesh out
the details regarding these different natural inclinations and how they
tend to operate in a range of situations. At the least, Mencius here draws
our attention to a number of basic natural moral inclinations that are
simply absent in Aquinas's discussion of the natural law. This is not to
say that Aquinas's list of inclinations is incompatible with that of Men
cius; we might think of Mencius's four inclinations as more concrete
instances of Aquinas's more general inclination toward life in society.
I think that two points are highlighted by reflection on the natural
inclinations in Aquinas and Mencius. The first is that while a case can be
made for the universality of the natural inclinations identified by both
Aquinas and Mencius, the list of the natural inclinations is clearly not
the product of bare empirical observations but is connected to the values
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and ideals and the larger moral framework endorsed by each thinker.
Aquinas's understanding of the natural inclinations, for example, is in
formed by his Aristotelian understanding of the human soul as exhibit
ing powers of the intellect and will, along with sensory and nutritive
capacities. Moreover, on Aquinas's view, one can achieve perfect happi
ness, and therefore perfect virtue, only with the aid of divine grace. In
Mencius we can see each natural inclination as the base from which one
develops the set of virtues that will enable one to live an excellent life
within a Confucian community. This is especially clear in the sprout of
deference, which leads to the virtue of ritual propriety and proper re
spect for the elderly. In this way, while Aquinas identifies natural incli
nations that are more universally applicable, Mencius's account of the
natural inclinations is much more closely connected to the Confucian
way of life. The point is that although both thinkers can certainly make
a case for the existence of these natural inclinations by appealing to em
pirical observations, their normative significance cannot be fully under
stood without an appeal to the broader ethical framework within which
each of these inclinations gains its role and significance.
What the above remarks also indicate is that neither Aquinas nor
Mencius employs a purely scientific or nonnormative understanding
of human nature. While both thinkers draw attention to observational
experience in supporting their views, their understandings of human
nature and the natural inclinations are developed in light of the values
and ideals that shape their understandings of both human flourishing
and the common good.^° This is why the common objection to natural
law ethics—that human beings are afflicted by various immoral or vi
cious tendencies—does not carry much force for these thinkers.^^ Now,
if one has a purely scientific understanding of human nature, as solely
constituted by the most widespread dispositions and tendencies, then
such an objection is devastating. But any sophisticated moral frame
work that invokes considerations about human nature will understand
human nature in a holistic way, as incorporating those dispositions and
inclinations that play an important role in the characteristic activities
and functions that are necessary for achieving a flourishing life. So, for
example, while human beings undeniably have widespread immoral ten
dencies toward envy and violence, such dispositions, from the point of
view of the common good and individual wellbeing, are detrimental
for us and so would not fall within the conception of human nature that
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is closely connected to the concept of the human good. Another point
one could also make is that such dispositions are not basic or funda
mental to human nature but rather are outgrowths of other, more fun
damental aspects of human nature such as our natural inclination to like
and be attached to those who are familiar to us. Such an inclination, one
might argue, is not in itself morally bad, although it could lead to vicious
traits like racism. On the other hand, even though virtues like courage,
generosity, or gratitude may not be as widespread as vicious tendencies
(although this is a point that needs to be settled through empirical re
search), they can be shown to play a beneficial role in human lives by
building stronger, peaceful communities and contributing to our over
all wellbeing.
CONTEMPORARY WESTERN MORAL philosophers tend not to take
seriously the importance of learning from, let alone understanding, tra
ditions such as Confucianism and Catholicism. One possible source of
this dismissive attitude is the fear that by being adherents of a particular
tradition one becomes rigidly committed to the norms and values of that
tradition, disabling one from making autonomous judgments that are
free from the strong commitments of a particular worldview. While this
is an understandable concern, one point worth considering is that we all
bring to the philosophical table a set of commitments and values and
that none of us are completely free from the influences of culture and
society, as well as our own particular set of life experiences. (Would we
really want to be completely detached from such influences?) Moreover,
one could make a serious case that belonging to a community or tradi
tion with shared values and commitments offers a better social, moral,
and intellectual environment for making progress. Even the secular phi
losopher benefits much from being a member of a wider philosophical
community, which promotes certain values and standards (which one
might not always find congenial) that help to sustain philosophical
dialogue. This is certainly true in science, where a scientific community
that works with the shared values of cooperation, openmindedness,
and rigorous experimentation will be in a much better position to build
on past research and facilitate progress. Numerous other disciplines
could also be cited in support of this thought: architecture, jazz, portrait
painting, architecture, and chess. Each discipline involves a community
with a common standard that draws upon past achievements. Creativity
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and innovation—crucial for the success of any discipline—are not gen
erated in a vacuum but develop within a particular ongoing tradition of
thought and practice. Criticisms and revisions certainly have an essen
tial role to play in the development of a tradition, but even they are
made against the background of a shared framework, constituted by
shared goals and ends.
I hope these remarks draw attention to reasons why traditions play
such an important and indispensable role in our lives. On the other hand,
as noted earlier, there is an understandable fear that deep commitments
to traditions can generate a fanatical and intolerant attitude that has been
at times a source of hatred and violence. What we need, then, are tradi
tions that are capable of sustaining and nourishing the lives of those who
occupy the globalized, modern society that we inhabit today. Here I
would argue that a commitment to a form of natural law tradition offers
a helpful way of meeting this demand, especially by drawing attention
to the fact that we share a common nature that undergirds the basic
human rights that can be enjoyed by all human beings. For despite the
misapplication and abuse of the concept of human nature that we un
fortunately find in history, the recognition of our shared humanity can
serve as a powerful moral resource for anchoring the respectful attitude
that allows us not only to tolerate but to positively appreciate the com
mitments and values of other traditions.
Returning to Mencius and Aquinas, we see that both thinkers were
profoundly influenced by their respective traditions, although because
of the importance they placed on understanding human nature they were
also keen observers of human behavior in all its varieties, virtues, and
vices. And while they disagree in significant ways about the ultimate
ends of human life (contemplative union with God for Aquinas, a sagely
life within a Confucian community for Mencius), they help us identify
certain normatively significant aspects of human nature that will help us
recognize those basic inclinations and needs to which we must carefully
attend if we are to realize both intrapersonal and interpersonal flourish
ing. As noted earlier, while Aquinas identifies broader natural inclina
tions, such as sociality, that we can clearly recognize as necessary for
living any recognizably human life, Mencius —from a distinctively Con
fucian perspective—draws attention to moral dispositions that he takes
as necessary for a life that goes well. And while Mencius's conception of
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the proper development of these dispositions is indeed inseparable from
his Confucian ideals and values, I believe that in important ways even
those of us living in contemporary America can recognize that such
emotional dispositions as compassion or shame are powerful sources of
human motivation and can be directed and shaped in ways that promote
wellbeing.
While few of us would accept every value or ideal articulated by
these two profound thinkers, I am confident that their insights, espe
cially concerning the kinds of creatures we are and the sorts of individual
and communal goods necessary for achieving the good life, will strike us
as remarkably relevant to our lives. For Mencius and Aquinas, this last
point would be unsurprising.
NOTES

1. For a rolebased interpretation, see Ames (2011); for a consequentialist
interpretation, see Im (2011); for a sentimentalist interpretation, see Liu (2002);
for virtue ethicalinterpretations, see Yu (2007), Van Norden (2007), and Ivanhoe
(2000).
2. Of course, as Michael Slater has pointed out to me, most contemporary
naturalists would find even this aspect of natural law ethics problematic. At the
end of the day there will remain substantive disagreements about the need for
the divine and about the metaphysics of value. By no means am I claiming that
a strict Humean naturalist and a Thomistic natural law theorist can ultimately
agree on fundamental metaethical and normative issues.
3. Murphy (2011).
4. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica (hereafter ST) III, Q. 91, Art. 2.
All citations to this work are to Freddoso's translation (Aquinas 2009) and are
subsequently given parenthetically in the text.
5. There are difficult issues here about how forms can exist in the mind of
God and other metaphysical questions concerning the nature of God. Given the
goals of this chapter, it will not be necessary to discuss these issues in detail.
6. But since God, on Aquinas's view, creates natures (including the nature
of humans) through divine willing, isn't the binding force of the natural law still,
perhaps indirectly, determined by divine command? I don't see a problem with
this characterization, but what is clear is that once God has created human beings
constituted with a particular nature, what determines their proper end and their
flourishing is fixed. Not even God could simply will that a radically different
life was good for human beings unless God changed human nature radically, in
which case the category of "human being" might no longer apply. Contrast this
position with that of a divine voluntarist like William of Ockham, who thought
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that it was metaphysically possible for God to command us to murder, steal, or
even hate God. Aquinas would deny that such commands are metaphysically
possible, since such commands would not accord with the human good as
determined by human nature.
7. We find in the voluntarists a sharp division between natural and moral
goodness that natural law theorists like Aquinas or eudaimonists like Aristotle
would deny. This sharp separation between the natural and the moral continues
to exert a powerful influence on modern moral philosophy, for example, in con
temporary discussions of egoism and altruism.
8. Mengzi 2A6. All citations of the Mengzi (Mencius) are from Van Nor
den's (2008) translation and are subsequently given parenthetically in the text.
9. For a lucid and helpful discussion of the importance of the agricultural
metaphors in Mencius and also an account of Mencius's overall philosophical
project, see Ivanhoe (2000,1523).
10. This is not to say that Mencius's sprouts are completely dormant; they
are to varying degrees active.
11. Ivanhoe (2007,216).
12. There is scholarly dispute concerning the nature of Heaven {tian)\ for
example, whether Heaven is a transcendent or immanent being, or whether
Heaven is personal or impersonal. These issues, while important, are not directly
relevant to the purposes of this chapter, so I will not address them here. For what
I take to be the most plausible interpretations on these issues, see Puett (2002);
Ivanhoe (2007); and Cline (2013).
13. Additionally, there is an antilegalist strand in Confucianism that takes
laws as problematic because (a) human beings tend to shirk external constraints,
and (b) human Ufe is too complex to admit of laws that can be applied in all cases.
While I think the Confucian tradition focuses on the cultivation of character for
these reasons, I think there is enough evidence that early Confucians believed
there are general moral rules grounded in considerations of virtue and flourish
ing, such as rules against murder and theft. And even Aquinas finds ways of ac
commodating hard cases: for example, when someone steals to feed his starving
family. In such a case, Aquinas argues, the surplus property of the wealthy be
comes "common property" because of human need, so there is no theft taking
place in such cases {ST IIII Q. 66, Art. 7). Similarly the Confucian tradition
readily acknowledges difficult cases and the need to use wise judgments to ap
propriately weigh different values. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing
me on this point, although more needs to be said.
14. An even more direct link between moral rules and Heaven might be es
tablished by an appeal to the idea of Heaven's mandate in the Mengzi, Because
Mencius takes one's "proper fate," which for Mencius is decreed by Heaven, as
involving certain absolute moral prohibitions, for instance, to never die as a
criminal {Mengzi 7hi), it appears that certain divine commands are issued di
rectly by Heaven, resembling in a way the Ten Commandments given by God
in the Old Testament. I think the existence of such commands by either Heaven
or God is compatible with a natural law theory, as long as such commands are
not expressions of an arbitrary will but are connected to considerations of human
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flourishing grounded in human nature. The idea would be that the commands
are made because following them is conducive to the human good. I thank P. J.
Ivanhoe for this point.
15. One might wonder, then, whether a moral defect would be attributable
to Heaven. But in Mencius's view, the lack of a moral sprout in someone is the
result of individual failure or an improper environment. See Mengzi 6A7.
16. Irwin (2006, 326).
17. Along these lines, we might consider calling Mencius's account a
"natural norm theory." I am sympathetic to this idea, and much depends on how
we should understand the meaning of law, which is itself a very complex issue.
But given a broader understanding of law, which I think is legitimate, we can
reasonably describe Aquinas (and Mencius) as holding a natural law theory. I
thank Michael Slater for raising this point.
18. Admittedly, the concept of moral obligation plays a much less promi
nent, and clearer, role in Mencius than in Aquinas. But as I noted above, I think
Mencius endorses certain general obligations such as "Treat your elder as an
elder" or "Cultivate the moral sprouts." And it is not implausible to think that for
Mencius failing to carry out these obligations made one morally blameworthy.
19. It is worth noting that the early Confucians believed nonhuman ani
mals also exhibited certain protomoral tendencies and that later Confucians
such as Zhu Xi held that they even fully possessed the virtues, while unable to
fully express them because of the limits of their physical constitution {qi). This
issue played a pivotal role in the "Horak Debate" that began in eighteenth
century Korea. See Kim (2015).
20. In this way, they differ from those naturalists (especially of the reduc
tionist sort) who would understand human nature as a purely descriptive notion
that is perhaps anchored in facts about what is statistically normal for human
beings.
21. For such objections, see Woodcock (2006) and Andreou (2006).
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